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New York Mental Hygiene Law 
on General Contract Law 
by 
Winston Spencer Waters* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the common law doctrine of 
contracts involving persons deemed to be adjudicated and non-
adjudicated mentally incompetent. It reviews the current case 
law in New York as it relates to contracts of persons deemed to 
be "incapacitated" pursuant to Article 81 of the Mental 
Hygiene Law. The article attempts to outline the similarities 
and differences between general contract law and the Mental 
Hygiene Law as they relate to contracts ofthe "incompetent 
person" and the "incapacitated person." The burden of proof 
required to establish "incapacity" pursuant to the Mental 
Hygiene Law and mental capacity required to enter into a 
contract is also discussed. 
I. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW 
Early New York Court of Appeals cases clearly 
established the contract rules regarding adjudicated and non-
adjudicated incompetents. A contract made with a person duly 
adjudged incompetent and for whom a committee has been 
appointed is void 1 and a contract of a non-adjudicated 
*Associate Professor of Law, Adelphi University, School of 
Business, Garden City, New York. 
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incompetent is voidable? In an early decision, the New York 
Court of Appeals held in Blinn v. Schwartz, that a deed of a 
person actually insane, but never so adjudged, is not void, in 
the sense of being a nullity. It is voidable at his election upon 
recovering his reason, and may then be ratified or avoided at 
his pleasure. The deed has force and effect until the option to 
declare it void is exercised.3 This privilege is denied to the 
party with whom the mental incompetent contracted.4 
There are different tests to determine if the requisite 
mental capacity to contract existed. 
Test I 
In New York State, the requisite mental capacity to 
enter a contract has been measured by what is largely a 
cognitive test.5 This test examines whether the contracting 
party was capable of understanding and appreciating the nature 
and consequences of the particular transaction. The level of 
"insanity" to avoid the contract must be an absolute incapacity 
to understand the effect of the act. Therefore, mere weakness 
of mind, or partial insanity or monomania, unconnected with 
the subject matter of the contract, is not sufficient. A moderate 
degree of incapacity may be sufficient where the transaction is 
accompanied by fraud, imposition or duress.6 Persons 
suffering from a disease such as Alzheimer's are not presumed 
incompetent. 7 
Test 2 
The second test is the motivational test. This test does 
not examine whether or not the contractual party understood 
the transaction. It focuses on whether the act of entering into 
the agreement was the result of mental illness. The 
motivational test is subjective. It applies when there is 
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evidence that, even though understanding was complete, the 
nature of a particular mental disease was such that the capacity 
of a contracting party to control his acts was eliminated and he 
was induced to enter the contract. This test recognizes the 
ability of mental disease such as manic depressive psychosis to 
control a person's actions despite the individual having an 
understanding of the transaction. In Ortelere v. Teachers 
Retirement Bd., 8 the New York Court of Appeals, held that a 
modern understanding of mental illness, suggests that 
incapacity to contract or exercise contractual rights may exist, 
because of volitional and affective impediments or disruptions 
in the personality, despite the intellectual or cognitive ability to 
understand.9 Grace Ortelere, an elementary school teacher 
since 1924, suffered a "nervous breakdown" in March, 1964 
and went on a leave of absence which expired on February 5, 
1965. She was then 60 years old. On July 1, 1964, she came 
under the care of Dr. D'Angelo, a psychiatrist who diagnosed 
her breakdown as involutional psychosis, melancholia type. 
Dr. D'Angelo prescribed six weeks of tranquilizers and shock 
therapy. Dr. D'Angelo continued to see her monthly until 
March, 1965. On March 28, 1965, she was hospitalized after 
collapsing at home from an aneurysm and died ten days later. 
As a teacher she had been a member of the Teachers' 
Retirement System of the City ofNew York. This entitled her 
to certain annuity and pension rights, pre-retirement death 
benefits, and allowed her to exercise various options 
concerning the payment of her retirement allowance. On June 
28, 1958, she had executed a 'Selection of Benefits under 
Option One' naming her husband as beneficiary of the 
unexhausted reserve. Under this option, upon retirement her 
allowance would be lower retirement allowances, but if she 
died before receipt of her full reserve, the balance would be 
payable to her husband. On June 16, 1960, she designated her 
husband as beneficiary of her service death benefits in the 
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event she died prior to retirement. On February 11, 1965, 
when her leave of absence had just expired and while she was 
still being treated, she executed a retirement application, 
selecting the maximum retirement allowance payable during 
her lifetime with nothing payable on or after death. Three days 
earlier she had written the Teacher' s Retirement Board of the 
City of New York, stating that she intended to retire on 
February 12 or 15 or as soon as she received "the information I 
need in order to decide whether to take an option or maximum 
allowance." She asked eight specific questions, which 
demonstrated an understanding of the retirement system 
concerning the various alternatives available. An extremely 
detailed reply was sent, by letter of February 15, 1965, 
although by that date it was technically impossible for her to 
change her selection of how retirement benefits would be paid. 
The board's chief clerk, before whom Mrs. Ortelere executed 
the application, testified that the questions were answered 
verbally on February 11, 1965. Her retirement reserve totaled 
$62,165. Following her leave of absence, Mrs. Ortelere 
became very depressed and was unable to care for herself. Her 
husband brought an action to set aside his wife's retirement 
application by reason of her mental incompetency. The 
Supreme Court entered judgment declaring that the retirement 
application of decedent was null and void. Her husband 
recovered judgment for full amount of the reserve credited to 
her at the time of her death and the Retirement Board appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed and dismissed 
the complaint and the husband appealed. The New York Court 
of Appeals held that the Retirement Board of the Teacher's 
Retirement System of the City ofNew York was, or should 
have been, fully aware ofMrs. Ortelere's condition. They, or 
the Board of Education, knew of her leave of absence for 
medical reasons and her use of staff psychiatrists. 'The 
avoidance of duties under an agreement entered into by those 
who have done so by reason of mental illness, but who have 
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understanding, depends on balancing competing policy 
considerations. There must be stability in contractual relations 
and protection of the expectations of parties who bargain in 
good faith. On the other hand, it is also desirable to protect 
persons who may understand the nature of the transaction but 
who, due to mental illness, cannot control their conduct."10 
Incompetency to contract may exist, despite the presence of 
cognition, when a contract is made under the compulsion of 
manic depressive psychosis.11 
The law presumes the competence of a contractual 
party. In the case of an adjudicated incompetent, all that is 
necessary is the production of a certified copy of the judgment 
declaring the person to be "incompetent." In the case of a non-
adjudicated incompetent, the burden of proving one's 
incompetence is on the party alleging it. 12 The later must 
demonstrate that, because of the affliction, the person was 
incompetent at the time of the transaction. 13 In Ortelere, the 
court held that a showing of medically classified psychosis is 
required otherwise few contracts would be invulnerable to a 
psychological attack. 14 According to the court, it was apparent 
the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that, 
when she acted on February 11 , she did so as a result of serious 
mental illness, namely, psychosis.15 Grace Ortelere's 
psychiatrist testified that, as an involutional melancholiac in 
depression, she was incapable of making a voluntary "rational" 
decision.16 Lay witnesses cannot properly give an opinion as 
to party's mental capacity as to rationality or irrationality, even 
when such opinion might be based upon specific acts and 
conversations, or personal observations. 17 The lay witness 
could state the acts and conversations of which he had personal 
knowledge, and then be permitted to say whether, in his 
judgment, such acts and conversations were rational or 
irrational. 18 
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II. THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW 
Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law was enacted in 
1992 after an extensive study of the statutes governing 
fiduciary appointments for incapacitated persons by the New 
York State Law Revision Commission. Although its initial 
purpose was to revise former Article 77 (conservatorship) and 
former Article 78 (committeeship) of the Mental Hygiene Law, 
the Commission ultimately found it necessary to establish a 
new statutory system to provide for the needs of disabled 
persons. The Commission concluded that former Articles 77 
and 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law failed to provide relief 
sufficient to meet the needs of persons who, while neither 
incompetent nor substantially impaired are functionally limited 
in providing for the activities of daily. 19 Rather than amending 
the existing committeeship and conservatorship statutes, the 
Commission proposed the adoption of a new statutory system 
of guardianship to be set forth in Article 81 of the Mental 
Hygiene Law. In 1992, the Legislature complied by repealing 
former Articles 77 and 78 and enacting the proposed 
guardianship statute as Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law. 
The primary objective of Article 81 is to provide a system of 
fiduciary appointments for persons who are unable to provide 
for the activities of daily living.20 In a proceeding brought 
pursuant to Article 81, however, the court is not called upon to 
determine whether an individual is competent or incompetent.21 
A finding of incapacity by the court conducting the hearing 
does not establish that a person is incompetent. 22 Article 81 
specifically provides that the appointment of a guardian shall 
not be conclusive evidence that the person lacks capacity for 
any other purpose, including the capacity to dispose of property 
by will except those powers and rights which the guardian is 
granted.23 
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The protocol for the proceedings are defined by the 
statute.24 Any party has the right to (1) present evidence; 
(2) call witnesses, including expert witnesses; (3) cross 
examine witnesses, including witnesses called by the court; 
( 4) be represented by counsel of his or her choice. The hearing 
must be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be 
incapacitated, either at the courthouse or where the person 
resides, to permit the court to obtain its own impression of the 
person's capacity. If the person alleged to be incapacitated 
physically cannot come or be brought to the courthouse, the 
hearing must be conducted where the person resides unless: 
(1) the person is not present in the state; or (2) all the 
information before the court clearly establishes that (i) the 
person alleged to be incapacitated is completely unable to 
participate in the hearing or (ii) no meaningful participation 
will result from the person's presence at the hearing.2 
Article 81 defines the required burden and quantum of 
proof necessary in a guardianship proceeding.26 The standard 
of proof must demonstrate that a person is incapacitated based 
upon clear and convincing evidence.27 The statute permits a 
court for "good cause shown" to waive the rules of evidence. 28 
It permits hearsay evidence to be admitted into the proceedings 
through the testimony of a court evaluator9 and allows a court 
evaluator to testify about his report which usually contains 
hearsay evidence if the court deems such information to be 
reliable.30 The law requires a hearing with witnesses.31 There 
is no requirement expert witnesses, such as a psychiatrist, 
psychologist be called. The court can take testimony from a 
nurse or social worker. In some cases, the court has ruled that 
testimony of lay witnesses is suffice for a finding of a person 
being " incapacitated. "32 
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The finding of a "substantial impairment" under former 
Article 77 concerning conservatorships did not establish 
incompetence allowing a court to declare a contract "void." In 
an Article 77 proceeding, a psychiatrist was required to testify 
concerning the ability or inability of the alleged conservatee to 
manage business matters only. The determination that a person 
was in need of a "committee" under former article 78 
concerning committteeships did establish imcompetence 
allowing a court to declare a contract "void." In an Article 78 
proceeding, a psychiatrist was required to testify concerning 
the ability or inability of the alleged incompetent to manage 
both person and property. The finding of "incapacity" pursuant 
to article 81 gives the court the power to declare contracts of 
the "incapacitated" to be void. The Article 81 court is given 
the power, if it determines that the person is incapacitated and 
appoints a guardian: to modify, amend, or revoke any 
previously executed appointment, power, or delegation or any 
contract, conveyance, or disposition during lifetime or to take 
effect upon death, made by the incapacitated person prior to the 
appointment of the guardian. 33 Article 81 courts have held that 
(1) a marriage contract constitutes a contract within the 
meaning of the Mental Hygiene Law.34 As such, it is subject to 
revocation by the court on the ground that a party thereto for 
whom a guardian has been appointed was " incapacitated" at 
the time it was contracted rendering such party incapable of 
consenting thereto by reason of want of understanding. 35 
Health care proxies, durable powers of attorney, amended and 
restated certificates of trusts, and Last Will and Testaments 
have also been invalidated.36 The Appellate Division in 
affirming the Surrogate Court held that mental incapacity 
invalidated an individual's durable powers of attorney, health 
care proxy, and amended and restated certificate of trust, 
executed prior to appointment of guardian upon a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence the incapacitated person 
executed the documents at a time when she was 
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incapacitated.37 Moreover, in modifying the Surrogate's 
decision, the Appellate Division stated the Last Will and 
Testament that was signed and witnessed at approximately the 
same time should have also been declared void.38 
CONCLUSION 
It is the view of the author that the repealed Articles 77 and 
78 worked well. The standard for a conservatorship 
proceeding pursuant to Article 77 of the Mental Hygiene Law 
required an evaluation and testimony from a psychiatrist that 
the alleged conservatee was unable to manage his business 
affairs. The standard for a committeeship proceeding pursuant 
to Article 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law required an 
evaluation and testimony from a psychiatrist that the alleged 
incompetent could not manage both his financial affairs and 
person necessitating the appointment of a committee. The 
burden of proof was similar to that required in a breach of 
contract action seeking to have a contract rescinded on the 
basis of mental incompetence. In such proceedings there is a 
requirement that a psychiatrist testify. 
Article 81 does not require testimony from a psychiatrist to 
have a person declared "incapacitated." Moreover, in a special 
proceeding, contracts can be declared voidable without the 
need for an actual finding of a mental illness. The burden of 
proof in an Article 81 proceeding have been relaxed. A 
contract can easily be avoided by filing an Order to Show 
Cause, attending a hearing within thirty days and having a 
nurse, social worker, psychologist, or doctor testify about 
behavior of the alleged incapacitated person. This type of 
testimonial evidence is dramatically different than that required 
previously pursuant to the repealed Articles 77 and 78 
respectively and in an action in Supreme Court to have a 
contract avoided due to mental incapacity. 
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